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Lectures 
CONSTITUTIONAL RHETORIC 
Jamal Greene* 
For close to a century, students of judicial behavior have suggested 
that what judges think is not altogether the same as what they say.  Within 
the legal academy, this claim has long been associated with legal realists 
who have argued that the formal legal rules explicated in judicial opinions 
are at least partly epiphenomenal, masking the influence that the personal 
characteristics and dispositions of adjudicators exercise over legal 
outcomes.1  Political scientists have argued, variously, that such outcomes 
are determined by ideology,2 social background,3 or political, 
professional, or other institutional constraints.4 
The notion that at least some “extralegal” factors influence judicial 
decision making is sufficiently intuitive and well established to be 
                                                 
*  Professor of Law, Columbia Law School.  Much of the substance of this Essay was 
delivered as the 2014 Seegers Lecture on Jurisprudence at Valparaiso University Law School.  
I would like to thank the faculty of the Law School and other guests at the Seegers Lecture 
for stimulating questions and comments. 
1 See generally JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1936) (arguing that the law 
is and should be uncertain and therefore requires the exercise of judicial discretion); KARL 
N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH:  ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (1930) (emphasizing the 
indeterminacy and contingency of law and fact). 
2 See generally C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT:  A STUDY IN JUDICIAL 
POLITICS AND VALUES, 1937–1947  (1948) (studying the values reflected in the voting patterns 
of the Roosevelt Court); GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND:  THE ATTITUDES AND 
IDEOLOGIES OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, 1946–1963 (1965) (using statistical methods to code 
Justices in ideological terms); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993) (advancing on the empirical models of Schubert and 
other attitudinalists); see also James L. Gibson, From Simplicity to Complexity:  The Development 
of Theory in the Study of Judicial Behavior, 5 POL. BEHAVIOR 7, 9 (1983) (summarizing the 
attitudinal model). 
3 See C. Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court 
Justices:  Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economic Decisions, 1946–1978, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 
355, 363 (1981) (constructing a model of Supreme Court Justice behavior drawing on factors 
relating, among other things, to socialization). 
4 See LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL 
JUDGES:  A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE (2013) (emphasizing a 
rational choice approach that integrates ideological considerations with professional and 
institutional constraints on judges); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy:  The 
Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 280 (1957) (discussing coherence 
between views of judges and majoritarian politics); see also Barry Friedman, The Politics of 
Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 262–63 (2005) (urging legal academics to integrate positive 
political science into their work). 
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regarded as a fact.5  It is fair to expect, moreover, that such factors wield 
still greater influence in close cases of constitutional law, and particularly 
in cases involving constitutional rights.  The outcomes of such cases are 
tightly bound up with deep and fundamentally divergent political 
commitments and social values.  A vast and growing literature explores 
these and related issues.6 
The dichotomy between the factors that drive judicial decision 
making, on one hand, and the public justification for such decision 
making, on the other, obscures a different dichotomy that lies wholly 
within the domain of opinion-writing.  This is the dichotomy between, on 
one hand, what judges say to explain or justify their decisions, and on the 
other hand, what judges say to persuade their audience that those 
decisions, and their associated reasons, are correct. 
Within constitutional law, it is sometimes assumed that there are two 
decision nodes in the process of legal adjudication:  first, the moment of 
decision; and second, the moment of explanation or justification.7  This 
second node is the point at which the judge conforms his or her decision, 
however reached, to his or her understanding of what the law requires.  
There is, however a third node.  Having decided what the law requires, 
the judge must further communicate that decision to a diverse audience 
of fellow judges, litigants, other legal professionals, and the broader 
public.  This act of communication is not simply a logical transcription of 
the legal justification reached at the second decision node.  Rather, or in 
addition, it requires constitutional judges to engage in forms of rhetoric.  
The challenge of legal persuasion bears no necessary relationship to the 
process of legal decision making:  it arises whether a decision is reached 
legalistically or politically, reflectively or intuitively, in good faith or bad. 
I shall refer to an opinion’s explanatory moves as demonstrative and its 
persuasive moves as rhetorical.8  This nomenclature serves a largely 
                                                 
5 See Donald R. Songer & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Not the Whole Story:  The Impact of Justices’ 
Values on Supreme Court Decision Making, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1049, 1049 (1996) (“A half century 
of empirical scholarship has now firmly established that the ideological values and the policy 
preferences of Supreme Court justices have a profound impact on their decisions in many 
cases.”). 
6 EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4, at 65–99. 
7 There is nothing talismanic about constitutional law.  This Essay’s observations surely 
apply to other legal domains.  The discussion is confined to constitutional law because it has 
some distinctive (if not unique) epistemological features of particular relevance to the 
discussion that follows.  See text accompanying notes 136–38.  
8 Aristotle defined “demonstration” as “a syllogism productive of scientific knowledge.”  
ARISTOTLE, POSTERIOR ANALYTICS bk. I, pt. II (G.R.G. Mure trans., 1928).  He defined 
“rhetoric” as “the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion.”  
ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC:  A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE bk. 1, ch. 2 (George A. Kennedy, 
trans., 2007) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC]. 
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expository purpose, for as we shall see, many judicial opinions in the 
United States—and nearly all Supreme Court opinions—are rhetorical 
devices whose content, even when logically grounded, is difficult to 
understand in purely demonstrative terms.  Still, the distinction helps to 
illuminate a set of rhetorical moves that are clearly not grounded in logos.  
It also preserves the argument—which I do not fully contest here—that 
constitutional law has propositional content independent of who 
describes it and to whom. 
What can we learn from recognizing the distinction between 
demonstration and rhetoric in constitutional cases?  Are there constraints 
on the forms of rhetoric that characterize judicial expression?  Are any 
constraints, such as they are, particular to constitutional adjudication?  
Are they particular to appellate adjudication?  What role should rhetoric 
play in constitutional opinion-writing? 
To offer some answers to these questions, I begin, in Part I, with four 
examples, or discourses, that anyone familiar with contemporary debates 
in U.S. constitutional law will recognize:  the distinction between original 
meaning and original intent; reference to anticanonical cases such as Dred 
Scott v. Sandford9 or Lochner v. New York;10 the relationship between 
substantive due process and the constitutional text; and the citation of 
foreign law in U.S. constitutional opinions.  Maintaining a notional 
distinction between demonstrative and rhetorical opinion-writing 
illuminates and better organizes what otherwise looks like a cycle of 
confusion and intractable disagreement that characterizes these 
discourses. 
Part II defends judicial rhetoric in constitutional cases as not just 
pervasive and inevitably descriptive, but also as normatively desirable.  
To be interesting, the claim must be that rhetoric can be appropriate even 
when it obscures the logic of or misleads the audience as to the underlying 
legal proposition.  Part II defends that claim on the ground that 
articulating constitutional law persuasively helps it to endure and 
therefore helps to constitute it over time.  This Essay concludes with some 
observations about the degree to which this claim is contingent upon an 
especially “protestant” understanding of constitutional authority and the 
operation of judicial review.11 
                                                 
9 60 U.S. 393 (1857). 
10 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
11 See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 29 (1988) (contrasting the “protestant” 
position on constitutional authority as “based on the legitimacy of individualized (or at least 
nonhierarchical communal) interpretation [], while the catholic position is that the Supreme 
Court is the dispenser of ultimate interpretation”). 
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I.  CASE STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL RHETORIC 
In Aristotle’s classical terms, rhetoric takes three overarching (and 
overlapping) forms:  logos or appeals to logic; ethos or appeals to the 
character of the speech; and pathos or appeals to emotion.12  As noted 
above, rhetoric can mislead.13  It does not always do so, but when it does 
not, we are more apt to call it exposition.14  This is especially so when, in 
legal discourse, rhetoric assumes the logical mode.  This Part discusses 
four case studies in which rhetorical expression, typically outside the 
logical mode, masquerades as demonstrative.  Recognizing the rhetorical 
nature of the claims helps us to understand arguments within these 
discourses that are otherwise mysterious. 
A. Original Meaning and Original Intent 
Originalism has been central to interpretive debates in constitutional 
law over the last three decades.15  For perhaps the last two of those 
decades, the importance of the distinction between original intent and 
original meaning has been central to debates over originalism.16 
Understanding the rhetorical dimensions of constitutional opinion-
writing helps us to see a compatibility between original meaning and 
original intent that we would otherwise overlook.  It is by now a familiar 
story within constitutional law circles that some conservative scholars 
and, later, officials in the Reagan Justice Department, explicitly promoted 
interpretation guided by the intentions of the constitutional drafters.17  
Liberal legal scholars responded by quite directly attacking the theoretical 
underpinnings of originalism as it was then practiced.18 
                                                 
12 ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC, supra note 8, at bk. I, ch. 2. 
13 See id. at bk. I, ch. 1 (arguing that appeals to emotion have no place in legal argument). 
14 See John S. Dryzek, Rhetoric in Democracy:  A Systemic Appreciation, 38 POL. THEORY 319, 
322 (2010) (arguing that those who dismiss rhetoric may miss its usefulness “in stimulating 
reasoned reflection and interchange”). 
15 See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 240 (2009) 
(providing a brief explanation of the evolution of originalism). 
16 See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 620 (1999) 
(identifying the shift from original intent to original meaning as the key move of the new 
originalism). 
17 See JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A 
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 153–57 (2005) (describing Attorney General Edwin Meese’s 
campaign to promote “a jurisprudence of original intention”); see also Edwin Meese, III, The 
Supreme Court of the United States:  Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 455, 464–
65 (1985) (advocating for judges to interpret the Constitution using the original intent of the 
drafters in order to promote democracy). 
18 O’NEILL, supra note 17, at 135–37. 
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There were several distinct lines of attack.  The notion that we can 
divine a single original intent from the underspecified and diverse views 
of multiple actors at the constitutional convention was criticized as naïve 
and fictitious.19  Some philosophers of language and those steeped in the 
hermeneutic tradition argued further that the psychological gymnastics 
required to place ourselves in the shoes of people living within a radically 
different culture, two centuries distant, simply could not be accomplished 
without importing our own views into the project.20  Legal historians such 
as H. Jefferson Powell argued that many of the framers themselves would 
have been surprised to learn that their understandings and expectations 
were being used as the basis for constitutional interpretation many 
generations after their deaths.21  If we accept Professor Powell’s rendering 
of the history, then someone who seeks the framers’ guidance could 
expect to be told, by the framers, not to seek their guidance.22 
The original meaning approach helped to respond to this academic 
criticism.23  Under this approach, constitutional interpretation is governed 
not by the subjective intentions of some amorphous group of “Framers” 
but rather by the meaning that the words of the Constitution would have 
had to a reasonable person who understands the background context.24  
Original meaning originalism does not have the problem of determining 
the collective intent of a large and diverse number of people—indeed it 
has the opposite problem, if any, since the person whose understanding it 
seeks is entirely hypothetical.25  Original meaning originalism also does 
not have the problem of being potentially foreclosed by the framers’ own 
expectations as to constitutional method.26  Professor Powell’s article itself 
suggests that the framers would have understood the constitutional text 
to have an objectified meaning embodied within it, even as they 
                                                 
19 See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 
213–17 (1980) (discussing the complexity of determining how to identify the relevant framers 
and their aggregate intentions). 
20 See Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down:  A Critique of Interpretivism and 
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 793 (1983). 
21 See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 
885, 887–88 (1985). 
22 Id. 
23 See Barnett, supra note 16, at 620–28 (discussing generally the new originalist response 
to criticisms made against the old originalism). 
24 See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMM. 47, 
48 (2006) (explaining the reasonable person construct and its relevance to constitutional 
interpretation). 
25 See id. 
26 See Barnett, supra note 16, at 625–29. 
Greene: Constitutional Rhetoric
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2016
524 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50 
disclaimed reliance on the subjective intentions of constitutional 
drafters.27 
The broader advantage of original meaning originalism over original 
intent originalism is that it has a better-theorized claim to political 
authority.  The idea is that a democratically empowered supermajority 
ratified a constitutional text that had a particular meaning to that polity.28  
As a best practice, we should seek to understand what it is that was 
ratified, which is determined by a best and educated guess as to the 
meaning of the words at the time.29  The political authority of democratic, 
and indeed supermajoritarian, actors is leveraged to supply a reason why 
their understandings should be the ones that matter.  The original intent 
practice lacks this leveraging potential because no one ratified the 
subjective intentions of the framers.30  Indeed, since the Convention 
debates were not publicized, only people who were present in 
Constitution Hall could say with any confidence what those intentions 
even were.31 
It is fair to say that, among constitutional theorists, original meaning 
has won as a theory of originalism and original intent has lost.32  There is 
more, however, that can be said in favor of original intent than 
constitutional theorists tend to acknowledge.  The problems that beset 
reliance on original intent depend on it being understood in 
demonstrative terms, that is, on it being used to show or explain why some 
constitutional proposition is true.  Original intent arguments cannot serve 
as the legal equivalent to steps in a mathematical proof because we lack a 
satisfactory account of the political authority of the framers’ intentions 
standing alone.  But original intent arguments might also be used 
rhetorically, to persuade someone that some constitutional proposition is 
true, and this is an altogether different communicative exercise.33 
                                                 
27 See Powell, supra note 21, at 903–04, 914–15. 
28 See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION:  TEXTUAL MEANING, 
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 50–61 (1999).  Whittington is nominally an 
intentionalist, but he derives his intentionalism from his combined views that interpreters 
should seek the original meaning of the text and that that meaning is supplied by authorial 
intentions.  Whittington would distinguish intentions of this sort from subjective 
expectations as to how the Constitution should or would be interpreted.  Id. at 59–61. 
29 See Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s 
Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1118 (2003). 
30 See id. at 1139 (contending that the subjective views of the framers do not themselves 
count as authoritative, and did not influence the decisions of the ratifiers). 
31 See id. at 1115 (describing the secret nature of the proceedings that took place at the 
Philadelphia Convention). 
32 Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 718 (2011). 
33 Jamal Greene, The Case for Original Intent, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1697 (2012). 
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An example will be helpful.  Consider the dissenting opinion of Justice 
Elena Kagan in Town of Greece v. Galloway.34  The case concerned the 
constitutionality of a sectarian prayer that opened town board meetings 
in a town in upstate New York.35  The Court upheld the practice, but 
Justice Kagan argued that the prayer was not neutral as between religions 
and that this violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.36  
To support this point, she dropped the following footnote, which is worth 
quoting in full: 
That principle [of neutrality] meant as much to the 
founders as it does today.  The demand for neutrality 
among religions is not a product of 21st century “political 
correctness,” but of the 18th century view—rendered no 
less wise by time—that, in George Washington’s words, 
“[r]eligious controversies are always productive of more 
acrimony and irreconciliable [sic] hatreds than those 
which spring from any other cause.”  In an age when 
almost no one in this country was not a Christian of one 
kind or another, Washington consistently declined to use 
language or imagery associated only with that religion.  
Thomas Jefferson, who followed the same practice 
throughout his life, explained that he omitted any 
reference to Jesus Christ in Virginia’s Bill for Establishing 
Religious Freedom (a precursor to the Establishment 
Clause) in order “to comprehend, within the mantle of 
[the law’s] protection, the Jew and the Gentile, the 
Christian and Mahometan, the Hindoo, and infidel of 
every denomination.”  And James Madison, who again 
used only nonsectarian language in his writings and 
addresses, warned that religious proclamations might, “if 
not strictly guarded,” express only “the creed of the 
majority and a single sect.”37 
What was Kagan doing in referring to the presidential practices of 
Washington, Jefferson, and Madison?  One possibility is that these were 
steps in a logical process of justifying the claim that the Establishment 
Clause requires government neutrality towards religion.  The views and 
practices of these prominent early Americans might demonstrate the 
                                                 
34 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1828 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
35 Id. at 1815–16. 
36 Id. at 1841 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
37 Id. at 1844 n.1 (internal citations omitted). 
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meaning of the Establishment Clause.  Since Madison wrote the clause, his 
intentions might be viewed as at least helping to supply its meaning. 
This rendering of Justice Kagan’s dissent runs directly into the 
criticisms of original intent discussed above.  Neither Washington nor 
Jefferson played any formal role in the passage of the Establishment 
Clause.  Washington was not significantly involved in the drafting of or 
deliberation over the Bill of Rights, and under Article V, the President 
plays no official part in the passage of constitutional amendments.38  
Jefferson famously urged the adoption of a bill of rights,39 and as Justice 
Kagan’s dissent suggests, he had mature views about church-state 
relations.40  But there is no evidence that the Congress that considered the 
Bill of Rights was even aware of Jefferson’s views, much less that they 
were especially influenced by them.41  As to Madison, his authorship of 
the first draft of the Bill of Rights does not by itself endow his views as to 
the meaning of the words with political authority.  Indeed, the current 
language of the Establishment Clause differs from Madison’s initial draft, 
which itself tracked the language of amendments proposed in several 
state constitutional ratifying conventions.42  The logic through which the 
Establishment Clause “means” what Washington, Jefferson, or Madison 
believed or intended it to mean is obscure at best. 
A second possibility is that invocation of these three prominent 
framers was demonstrative in a different sense.  It could be that Justice 
Kagan was actually employing original meaning originalism.  That is, it 
could be that she took the publicly expressed views of Washington, 
Jefferson, and Madison to constitute evidence of how competent users of 
the English language who were well informed as to the constitutional 
context understood the words of the First Amendment.  Proponents of 
original meaning originalism often claim that this evidentiary function is 
precisely the role played by frequent invocations of the subjective views 
                                                 
38 See U.S. CONST. art. V. 
39 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 12 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 442 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1950). 
40 Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1844–45; THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF 
VIRGINIA 157–61 (William Peden ed., 1955). 
41 Mark D. Chadsey, Thomas Jefferson and the Establishment Clause, 40 AKRON L. REV. 623, 
632 (2007).  Jefferson did not leave Paris, where he was serving as Minister to France, until 
September 26, 1789, one day after Congress approved the amendments that would become 
the Bill of Rights.  See WILLIAM HOWARD ADAMS, THE PARIS YEARS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 22–
23 (1997); NEIL H. COGAN, THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS:  THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, 
AND ORIGINS 11 (1997). 
42 Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 
400–03 (2002). 
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of eighteenth century framers, including those expressed at the 
Philadelphia Convention and in The Federalist.43 
The problem with this position is that taking the views of Washington, 
Jefferson, and Madison to carry no more than evidentiary weight as to the 
meaning a reasonable eighteenth century American would ascribe to the 
Establishment Clause places these men on the same plane as an educated 
citizen who did not happen to be a U.S. President.  An account of the work 
performed by Justice Kagan’s references to Washington, Jefferson, and 
Madison that does not depend on their particular status as Founding 
Fathers misses something central to the force of her argument.  She does, 
after all, call them “the founders.”44 
And so a third possibility for understanding what Justice Kagan was 
doing in her Town of Greece dissent is that she was recruiting Washington, 
Jefferson, and Madison not to supply the original definition and scope of 
the Establishment Clause, but to “vouch” for the proposition that the 
Establishment Clause is neutral as between religions.  Here, the choice of 
Washington, Jefferson, and Madison is not because—or not only 
because—they have special insight into constitutional meaning, but rather 
(or in addition) because they are recognized as great statesmen and as 
American heroes, and it is useful to align oneself with such people’s views.  
This invocation of Washington, Jefferson, and Madison would fall outside 
the domain of demonstrative exposition and would move into the domain 
of rhetoric. 
References to the framers are frequently made in this way, and when 
made in this way, provide a response to some of the criticisms of original 
intent.  The problem of discerning collective intent from numerous, 
diverse, and underspecified sources disappears when the speaker 
privileges those framers whose imprimatur is especially valuable.  Indeed, 
the easy way to know that the framers are invoked as much for rhetorical 
as for strictly interpretive purposes is to consider the situations in which 
judges cite Anti-Federalists such as Brutus, Cato, or the Federal Farmer.  
These were learned statesmen every bit as much as Madison or Hamilton 
and had as much access to the English language and the constitutional 
context, but the Anti-Federalist is hardly ever used as positive authority 
to support originalist interpretation.45  Indeed, it is easy to find instances 
of the Anti-Federalist being used as negative authority, that is, as evidence 
                                                 
43 Barnett, supra note 16, at 622; Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 29, at 1133; see also Greene, 
supra note 33, at 1691–92. 
44 Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1844 n.1 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
45 See Greene, supra note 33, at 1692–94. 
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of what the Constitution does not mean.46  This practice is difficult to 
explain except in rhetorical terms. 
This, then, suggests a reconciliation of the original meaning and 
original intent positions.  Much of the time, these inquiries have different 
objectives, and so can peaceably coexist.  The possibility, raised by Powell, 
that the original intentions of the framers seem not to support original 
intent as an interpretive method ceases to be a problem for someone using 
the framers for rhetorical ends.  The use of the framers in this way is quite 
independent of the interpretive method used.  Justice Kagan, for example, 
is not an originalist, but she nonetheless uses the framers to her rhetorical 
benefit.  Affiliating her argument with theirs helps to establish its bona 
fides; it bolsters her credibility as a speaker, thereby approximating the 
ethical form of rhetoric.47 
B. Anticanonical Cases 
A second familiar discourse whose contours we may better 
understand by thinking carefully about rhetoric is judicial reference to 
certain kinds of precedent.  Recall the high-profile litigation over the 
constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act, culminating in National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.48  The bases for the 
unconstitutionality of the Act claimed by challengers were entirely 
structural in nature.  The argument was that requiring Americans to 
purchase health insurance exceeded the powers granted to Congress 
under the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the 
Taxing Power, and that threatening to withdraw Medicaid funding from 
states that did not expand eligibility under the program exceeded 
Congress’ power under the General Welfare Clause.49  Even though 
challengers disclaimed any individual rights attack on the Act, the 
Supreme Court’s notorious individual rights decision in Lochner v. New 
York made several appearances at oral argument.50 
                                                 
46 See id. at 1693. 
47 See Jamal Greene, Pathetic Argument in Constitutional Law, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1389, 1398 
(2013).  Aristotle’s use of ethical argument differs from the usage here. For Aristotle, 
persuasion through ethos emerged from the character of the speech itself.  See Colin P. Starger, 
Constitutional Law and Rhetoric, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (manuscript at 19–20) (forthcoming 
2016).  Aristotle’s understanding of ethos has never been the only view of the category, even 
classically.  See Michael J. Hyde, THE ETHOS OF RHETORIC xvi–xvii (Michael J. Hyde ed., 2004) 
(discussing Isocrates’ view that ethical persuasion results in part from the cultivated 
character of the speaker). 
48 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
49 Id. at 2585, 2599, 2602. 
50 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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Specifically, Solicitor General Donald Verrilli said that “to embark on 
the kind of analysis that [the healthcare law’s opponents] suggest the 
Court ought to embark on is to import Lochner-style substantive due 
process.”51  Chief Justice Roberts, thinking through the implications of the 
government’s argument, said “it would be going back to Lochner if we 
were put in the position of saying, no, you can use your commerce power 
to regulate insurance, but you can’t use your commerce power to regulate 
this market in other ways.”52  Finally, Justice Sotomayor asked Paul 
Clement, representing the challengers to the mandate, whether he was 
advancing “a Lochner era argument that only the States can [require the 
purchase of insurance] even though it affects commerce.”53 
The Lochner Court invalidated a New York law that regulated the 
working hours of bakers.54  It was an individual rights case, not a 
structural case.  It was about state rather than federal power.  It was about 
controlling working hours, not forcing individuals to purchase health 
insurance or anything else.  It had been decided more than a century 
earlier and had been effectively overruled in 1937.55  And yet the Solicitor 
General, the Chief Justice, and Justice Sotomayor each invoked Lochner, 
and each invoked it for a different substantive point.  For Verrilli, Lochner 
stood for economic due process, for Chief Justice Roberts it stood for 
inappropriate judicial line-drawing with respect to Congress’ powers, and 
for Justice Sotomayor it stood for inherent limitations on federal power. 
Consider a second recent example.  In Obergefell v. Hodges, the 
Supreme Court declared that the Fourteenth Amendment requires states 
to extend marriage rights to same-sex couples.56  Dissenting, Chief Justice 
Roberts not only cited Lochner repeatedly, but also cited Dred Scott v. 
Sandford as an example of substantive due process gone awry.57  Chief 
Justice Taney’s lead opinion in Dred Scott had declared that a law 
prohibiting slavery in federal territories would violate the due process 
rights of traveling slaveholders.58  Chief Justice Roberts’ Obergefell dissent 
poignantly reminds us that “Dred Scott’s holding was overruled on the 
                                                 
51 Transcript of Oral Argument at 30, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 
(2012) (No. 11-398). 
52 Id. at 40. 
53 Id. at 67–68. 
54 See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 52. 
55 See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (invalidating a minimum 
wage law for women); see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125 (1941) (rejecting a 
substantive due process challenge to the maximum hours provisions of the Fair Labor 
Standards Act of 1938). 
56 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015). 
57 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857); see also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2616–17 
(Roberts, J. dissenting). 
58 See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 450. 
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battlefields of the Civil War and by constitutional amendment after 
Appomattox.”59 
Citing a case for reasons unrelated to its underlying facts makes little 
sense if we understand invocation of precedent in purely demonstrative 
terms.  In the common law model, precedent is cited in order to be 
affirmed as implicating similar application of law to fact, or in order to be 
distinguished as relying on different facts.60  Why cite and discuss Lochner 
in a case in which there is no state law issue, no individual rights issue, 
and no maximum hours or labor issue?  It is difficult, moreover, to 
construct an orthodox theory of precedent under which Chief Justice 
Roberts’ reference to the Dred Scott decision was relevant in a marriage 
equality case.  He could not mean to say that granting marriage rights to 
same sex couples—which he said had “undeniable appeal”61—was akin 
to endorsing chattel slavery.  It could be that he meant to say that judicial 
overreach was the common sin in both cases, and led to war in Dred Scott.  
However the relationship between Dred Scott and the start of the Civil War 
is hardly obvious, and in any event Chief Justice Roberts does not believe 
same-sex marriage will lead to existential armed conflict or anything like 
it.62  Furthermore, since Dred Scott is conceded not to be good law, there is 
no institutional need to cite it, grudgingly or otherwise.  So why did he 
cite it? 
In the National Federation of Independent Business oral argument and in 
Chief Justice Roberts’ Obergefell dissent, Lochner and Dred Scott 
respectively were being used rhetorically rather than demonstratively.  
Lochner is a third rail of American constitutional law for reasons having 
little to do with maximum hour laws or even individual rights.  The 
Lochner era was subject to a high-profile political repudiation that is 
perceived to have helped end the Great Depression and led to the creation 
of the modern administrative state.  Dred Scott’s negative valence (these 
days)63 is less for its invocation of substantive due process or even its 
support for slavery, but rather for its cold repudiation of the possibility of 
                                                 
59 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2617 (Roberts, J. dissenting). 
60 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER:  A NEW INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL 
REASONING 103–05 (2009). 
61 Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611. 
62 See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE:  ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW 
AND POLITICS 561–67 (1978). 
63 The conventional story as to what was wrong with Dred Scott has undergone revision 
over time.  For many years its error was viewed as prudential rather than moral:  in light of 
the holding that Scott was ineligible for citizenship and therefore could not claim diversity 
jurisdiction in federal court, the Court had neither the need nor even the power to adjudicate 
his substantive claim to freedom.  United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 590 (1957); 
FEHRENBACHER, supra note 62, at 335–36. 
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black citizenship.64  Citation of other cases—Brown v. Board of Education65 
on the positive side and Plessy v. Ferguson66 and Korematsu v. United States67 
on the negative side—serve a similar rhetorical function.  Their negative 
valence is supplied by events outside of law as such, and it acts as a kind 
of epithet that stirs the blood, like any good pathos-driven (or “pathetic”) 
argument.68  Mining citations to these cases for some narrowly doctrinal 
connection to the cases in which they are cited is often futile. 
C. The Oxymoron of Substantive Due Process 
A third example, more tentative than the first two, where recognizing 
the role of rhetoric might illuminate constitutional practice relates 
indirectly to Lochner and relates directly to one of the many charges laid 
against it:  its invocation of substantive due process.  It is frequently said 
that substantive due process makes nonsense of the constitutional text, 
that it is oxymoronic.  John Hart Ely memorably wrote that substantive 
due process is “a contradiction in terms, sort of like ‘green pastel 
redness.’”69  Commentators have called the notion of “substantive” 
process an “atextual invention”70 that is “incorrigibly self-
contradictory.”71  Indeed, Ely’s phrase about green pastel redness has 
itself has been cited in well over 100 law review articles.72  Modern 
substantive due process is a favorite target for conservatives in particular.  
To take one illustrative example, Robert Bork wrote in 1990 that “[i]t is 
                                                 
64 Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857) (“[Blacks] had for more than a century 
before been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the 
white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights 
which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be 
reduced to slavery for his benefit.”). 
65 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
66 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
67 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
68 See Greene, supra note 33, at 1440. 
69 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (1980). 
70 Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?, 
103 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 897 (2009). 
71 CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM:  HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND 
UNNAMED 91 (1997). 
72 See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Jackson, Be Careful What You Wish For:  Why McDonald v. City of 
Chicago’s Rejection of the Privileges or Immunities Clause May Not Be Such a Bad Thing of Rights, 
115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 561, 579 (2011); Adam Lamparello & Charles E. MacLean, It’s the People’s 
Constitution, Stupid:  Two Liberals Pay Tribute to Antonin Scalia’s Legacy, 45 U. MEM. L. REV. 
281, 311 (2015); Laurence H. Tribe, The Ones I Feel Sorry For, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1760, 1761 
(2004). 
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clear that the text of the due process clause will not support judicial efforts 
to pour substantive rather than procedural meaning into it.”73 
The problem with these broadsides against substantive due process is 
that they are not true.  While there may be a strong case against 
substantive due process on historical or prudential grounds, the textual 
case against it is remarkably weak.74  As is clear from due process cases 
dating at least to Goldberg v. Kelly, the word “due” requires an adjudicator 
to assess the severity of the deprivation in order to specify the appropriate 
procedure.75  The constitutional text does not limit the word “process” to 
judicial procedures, and so to say that some deprivations are sufficiently 
severe that neither ordinary majoritarian legislation nor rational basis 
judicial review is sufficient to affect them is consistent with the text.  This 
is substantive due process in a nutshell:  a law that restricts fundamental 
rights either requires the supermajority necessary for a constitutional 
amendment or it requires the legislature to pursue some important 
interest, for there to be a reasonable means-ends fit, and for the fitness of 
the legislation by these measures to be evaluated judicially. 
Again, there might be any number of objections to this exercise of 
judicial review, but there is nothing in the text of the Constitution alone 
that makes substantive due process absurd or self-contradictory.  Of 
course, constitutional text does not stand alone, unadorned by historical 
practice or doctrinal evolution.  Giving “process” the liberal reading 
suggested above may seem to misread a term of art within legal discourse, 
one that tends to be associated with a specific set of adjudicatory or quasi-
adjudicatory procedures and prerequisites:  notice of adverse claims, an 
opportunity to be heard before a neutral tribunal, the availability of 
counsel, and so forth.  But in fact the textual criticism of substantive due 
process is itself a strategy to arrest doctrinal evolution towards an 
expansive, contextual reading of the broader due process clause.76  The 
Supreme Court has never rejected substantive due process and there is 
ample historical evidence to suggest that the generation that ratified the 
                                                 
73 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:  THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 32 
(1990); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2640 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(referring to substantive due process as a “distort[ion of] the constitutional text); ANTONIN 
SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:  FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 24–25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (arguing that to adopt substantive 
due process is “to abandon textualism”). 
74 See Jamal Greene, The Meming of Substantive Due Process, 30 CONST. COMM. -- 
(forthcoming 2016) (manuscript on file with the author). 
75 See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (holding that due process requires an 
administrative hearing prior to the withdrawal of welfare benefits). 
76 Cf.  L.L. Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REV. 363, 377 (1930) (arguing that the claim that 
a legal term is a fiction “must be based ultimately on the notion that the word . . . has reached 
the legitimate end of its evolution and that it ought to be pinned down where it now is”). 
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Fourteenth Amendment understood the Due Process Clause as having 
substantive reach.77  That is, the clause is indeed a legal term of art, and its 
meaning is contested.  Claims about the inherent meaning of the text are, 
unremarkably, internal to trench warfare over the scope of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  There is nothing obvious about substantive due process, 
including its relationship to the text. 
That said, Ely’s phrase—“substantive due process is like green pastel 
redness”—is so felicitous because substance and process do form a standard 
dichotomy in legal discourse.78  Substantive due process suffers from a 
kind of marketing or optics problem:  proponents should simply leave the 
word “substantive” out or else perhaps start calling it legislative due 
process.  That might put the stress on “due,” which emphasizes its 
substantive character, rather than on “substantive,” which feels like it is 
in tension with “process.”79 
What does this have to do with rhetoric?  The idea that substantive 
due process is an oxymoron or is a contradiction in terms has significant 
rhetorical purchase, and the idea persists in part for that reason.  Even if 
the best case against substantive due process is historical or prudential 
rather than textual, the chuckles or knowing nods one can elicit by 
criticizing it as oxymoronic are worth more to a judge or commentator 
than even the most ingenious historical argument about the original 
understanding of the due process clause. 
This example is in some ways more interesting than our first two.  As 
described above, original intent arguments and invocations of 
anticanonical cases rely, respectively, on ethical and pathetic rhetorical 
modes.  By contrast, the fallacy of substantive due process as an oxymoron 
relies most substantially on a logical mode of persuasion.  The underlying 
proposition—that substantive due process is textually invalid—is 
supported by syllogistic, though ultimately sophistic, reasoning.  This 
observation should underscore that logical presentation of arguments 
may be entirely consistent with rhetoric and indeed there is good reason 
to believe that this is the dominant rhetorical form in U.S. constitutional 
opinions. 
                                                 
77 See Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408, 
416 (2010). 
78 ELY, supra note 69, at 18. 
79 See Timothy Sandefur, In Defense of Substantive Due Process, or the Promise of Lawful Rule, 
35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 330 (2012) (“A procedure-only approach to due process 
cannot account for the meaning of the word ‘due.’”). 
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D. Citation of Foreign Law 
A final example that can clarify how understanding the role of rhetoric 
might help us to better understand judicial practices comes from the 
debate over citation of transnational law in constitutional opinions. One 
of the main criticisms of the use of such sources is that it requires selective 
citation—“cherry-picking”—and thus lacks integrity.80  American judges 
and commentators engaged in foreign law citation tend either to self-limit 
or be limited by circumstance to English-language jurisdictions, Western 
or Westminster-influenced democracies, and jurisdictions whose opinions 
are sufficiently studied that they may meaningfully be cited and 
understood by the citing judge.81  This is a real problem from a certain 
perspective and indeed from the perspective that Justice Breyer—the 
Supreme Court’s most vocal defender of foreign law citation—has 
suggested motivates his citation practices.82  That perspective is what 
Mark Tushnet calls “functionalist.”83  In constitutional interpretation we 
do not just care about text, structure, history, and precedent, but we also 
care about consequences.  On this view, other jurisdictions whose 
constitutional judges have handled similar cases provide data points to 
help uncover a range of approaches that meet shared (or at least 
coinciding) objectives or purposes.84  We can look to those other 
jurisdictions to give us data on the consequences of adopting a particular 
approach within our own jurisdictions.85 
The problem is that assessing the consequences of a particular 
constitutional arrangement requires an empirical inquiry, and in 
conducting an empirical inquiry, one must be attentive to principles of 
case selection.86  The criteria for selection should be grounded in an 
                                                 
80 See Norman Dorsen, The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases:  
A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 519, 
521–22 (2005) (transcribing Justice Scalia’s complaint about selective citation of foreign 
examples); Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1581 (2004) (emphasizing that in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court picked 
decisions around the world that it favored). 
81 See RAN HIRSCHL, COMPARATIVE MATTERS: THE RENAISSANCE OF COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 205–06 (2014) (describing the tendency of comparative public law 
scholars to hold out as representative “the constitutional experience of half a dozen (on a 
good day) politically stable, economically prosperous, liberal democracies”). 
82 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
experiences of other jurisdictions “cast an empirical light on the consequences of different 
solutions to a common legal problem”). 
83 See Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 
1238 (1999). 
84 See id. 
85 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 976–77 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
86 See HIRSCHL, supra note 81, at 22–81. 
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empirical strategy that controls for relevant differences between selected 
jurisdictions, or else uses those differences as leverage in attaching weight 
to an independent variable of interest.87  Case selection emphatically 
should not be based on whether a jurisdiction writes in or translates its 
opinions into English88 or has judges who happen to be especially effective 
in circulating their work to a global audience.89  Once we recognize that 
empirical questions require attention to case selection principles, the 
implications for a functionalist approach are disquieting.  Judges can try 
their best to identify appropriate bases for comparison, but they have 
limited time and resources.  The problem of selection bias haunts the 
whole enterprise of constitutional comparison when the objective of that 
comparison is understood in functional terms. 
The observations of this Essay offer a way out.  Are the reasons for 
citation of foreign law in U.S. constitutional cases always demonstrative?  
Are they always, or even typically, aimed at supplying a descriptive 
account of constitutional practice elsewhere, as a way of filling in the 
meaning and requirements of a domestic constitutional norm?  Consider 
Roper v. Simmons, a prominent example of foreign law citation in a U.S. 
constitutional case at the Supreme Court.90  Roper concerned the 
constitutionality of executing convicted murderers who were juveniles at 
the time of the offense.91  After stating his conclusion that the practice 
contravenes the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual 
punishments, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, added a 
discussion of the prevalence of juvenile execution around the world.92  He 
included the following sentence:  “Respondent and his amici have 
submitted, and petitioner does not contest, that only seven countries other 
than the United States have executed juvenile offenders since 1990:  Iran, 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of 
                                                 
87 See id. at 245–55 (describing what Hirschl calls the “most similar cases” and the “most 
different cases” principles). 
88 See ROSALIND DIXON & TOM GINSBURG, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 13 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011) (“It is probably the 
case that 90% of comparative work in the English language covers the same ten countries, 
for which materials are easily accessible in English.”). 
89 See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 65–66 (2004) (discussing 
interactions among judges at global seminars); Hon. Claire L’Heureux-Dube, The Importance 
of Dialogue:  Globalization and the International Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 
26 (1998) (discussing personal contacts with other judges as a significant driver of global 
judicial dialogue).  Cf.  David S. Law & Wen-Chen Chang, The Limits of Global Judicial 
Dialogue, 86 WASH. L. REV. 523, 527 (2011) (arguing that citation patterns do not reflect 
judicial dialogue). 
90 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
91 See id. at 555–56. 
92 See id. at 575–78. 
Greene: Constitutional Rhetoric
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2016
536 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50 
Congo, and China.”93  These are all countries that are known to be deeply 
illiberal or that have committed or tolerated systematic human right 
abuses in the recent past.  It is possible to cite these examples functionally, 
as a step in an argument that says that continuing to execute juvenile 
offenders leads to illiberal outcomes.  But to complete the argument would 
require an empirical investigation of, for example, whether those 
countries that have abolished juvenile execution have done so through 
legislative or judicial pathways, what the effects on crime control have 
been, whether states are unitary or federal systems, and so forth. 
Alternatively, we can understand the importance of this style of 
citation in rhetorical rather than demonstrative terms.  What Justice 
Kennedy is really saying is that executing juveniles is uncivilized; citing 
the countries that do it communicates the message viscerally rather than 
demonstratively.  The criticism that Justice Scalia and others have made, 
that like legislative history, foreign law citation involves looking out over 
a crowd and just picking out your friends, seems exactly appropriate if we 
understand the practice in rhetorical terms.94  We like and trust our friends 
more than our enemies or mere acquaintances, and so we use our friends’ 
practices to vouch for our own or use association with the practices of our 
enemies to shame our opponents. The reason to cherry-pick Iran and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo in arguments against juvenile 
execution aligns with the reason to cherry-pick Anti-Federalists in 
arguments against disfavored constitutional positions. 
II.  JUDICIAL RHETORIC IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
These four examples all show ways in which employing a different 
conceptual vocabulary can help us transcend debates within 
constitutional theory that had seemed to be spinning their wheels.  But the 
way the examples do so is controversial.  Rhetoric has a bad reputation, 
and to say fallacious constitutional arguments are made in its service 
seems to reinforce the fallacy.95  This Part shows that rhetoric, even when 
misleading in a narrow sense, can serve as a partner to the legitimating 
discourse of constitutional law. 
Constitutional law has a set of familiar and overlapping taxonomies 
of argument forms.96  These forms are an important element of 
                                                 
93 Id. at 577. 
94 See Dorsen, supra note 80, at 530. 
95 See STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY:  CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE 
PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 471–75 (1989). 
96 See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE:  THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 3–92 
(1982) (specifying constitutional argument forms); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist 
Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1195–1209 (1987). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 50, No. 2 [2016], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol50/iss2/5
2016] Constitutional Rhetoric 537 
constitutional practice because constitutional law needs ways of 
distinguishing itself from politics.  By fostering implicit limits on the kinds 
of arguments that “count,” constitutional law discourse cultivates a 
distinctive normative community.  The kinds of arguments that 
characterize that discourse are typically said to include textual, structural, 
historical, precedent-based, and prudential arguments.97  Most arguments 
that count within the community of U.S. constitutional lawyers are either 
about the meaning of the constitutional text; implications generated from 
constitutional structure or the relationships immanent within the 
constitutional architecture; historical intentions or the contemporaneous 
meaning of the Constitution’s words; judicial precedent or historical 
political practice; or the consequences for the institutional legitimacy of 
the judiciary or for the effective functioning of governmental, and 
especially federal governmental, institutions.98  To this list we could add 
values-based arguments that appeal to some higher-order moral norm or 
ethical arguments drawing on the distinctive character of the American 
people, but whether these argument types are included is subject to some 
debate.99 
Scholars of classical rhetoric have their own set of taxonomies.100  The 
most basic one is the tripartite distinction between logos, ethos, and pathos 
discussed at the beginning of Part I.  Accepting the claim that rhetorical 
statements have a home within constitutional discourse requires one to 
integrate this or some related schematic into the well-established 
categories of constitutional argument.  One possibility is that these 
rhetorical forms simply supplement the traditional categories.  Thus, 
constitutional discourse is constituted in part by, say, appeals to emotion 
in addition to being constituted by, say, appeals to the constitutional text.  
Were this the best description of the role rhetoric plays in constitutional 
argument, it would defeat constitutional law’s claim to distinctiveness. 
The better view is that the forms of rhetoric modify rather than 
supplement, displace, or challenge the traditional categories.101  We can 
think of other modes—text, structure, history, precedent, and 
consequences—as being domains or subjects of constitutional 
argument.102  What makes constitutional argument a distinct form of 
political debate and political settlement is that it channels political dispute 
into these particular domains.  But what makes constitutional law 
                                                 
97 See BOBBITT, supra note 96, at 7; Fallon, Jr., supra note 96, at 1194. 
98 See Fallon, Jr., supra note 96, at 1252–68. 
99 See Patrick O. Gudridge, False Peace and Constitutional Tradition, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1952, 
1969, 1975 (1983) (reviewing BOBBITT, supra note 96). 
100 Greene, supra note 33, at 1463–65. 
101 See id. at 1424. 
102 See id. at 1394–95. 
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continuous with other forms of practical reasoning is that the 
communicative elements of constitutional law—its opinions—employ 
logical, ethical, and pathetic rhetorical strategies in order to persuade their 
audience that the propositions they assert, with respect to text, history, 
structure, and so forth, are correct.103 
Constitutional lawyers need to get this right.  It is easy to casually 
dismiss rhetoric in judicial opinion writing as either pernicious and 
lawless or trivial and unimportant.  But within the American system, the 
ability of a judge to persuade her audience that she is right forms part of 
the normative criteria for her performance.  Put otherwise, the fact that a 
judge is unable to persuade her audience that she is correct is, without 
more, a reason to think she might not be correct.104  Judges in the United 
States must constantly attend to the conditions of their own 
legitimacy105—Hamilton recognized that as early as Federalist 78 when he 
famously called the judicial branch the least dangerous branch, having 
“no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the 
strength or of the wealth of the society; . . . hav[ing] neither force nor will, 
but merely judgment.”106  What judges have is a jealously guarded 
reservoir of good will that lends moral force to their pronouncements.107 
One of the conditions for judicial legitimacy, therefore, is popular 
acceptance of what the courts are doing.108  This acceptance might be more 
important when a judge purports to invalidate the work of the popular 
branches than when she validates it, but it is important either way.  The 
case for its normative importance is strengthened to the degree scholars 
adopt forms of popular constitutionalism that place citizens at the table in 
constitutional interpretation and that privilege dialogue between judges 
and social and political actors. 
If persuasion carries independent normative weight in American 
constitutional law, then at least three somewhat unsettling implications 
might follow.  First, what a judge says in an opinion owes something to 
rhetoric.  That is, it is not enough for a judge writing an opinion to explain 
his or her thinking in a demonstrative sense.  He or she must also do so 
                                                 
103 See id. 
104 See Richard Primus, Double-Consciousness in Constitutional Adjudication, 13 REV. CONST. 
STUD. 1, 2 (2007). 
105 See Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959, 963 (2008). 
106 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, 392 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (discussing 
the need for judges to attend to the conditions of law’s public legitimation). 
107 In political science this reservoir is sometimes called diffuse support.  See infra notes 
122–23 and accompanying text. 
108 See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1792 
(2005) (maintaining that the Constitution’s legal legitimacy depends on its present 
sociological acceptance). 
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with at least some degree of style, perhaps even at the occasional expense 
of clarifying the argument in a demonstrative sense or to the satisfaction 
of a Platonic philosopher.  It is possible to overstate this tension.  We 
expect a certain degree of legalism from our judges, and so departing from 
that norm in an overt way will in many cases undermine an opinion’s 
persuasive effect.  Put another way, logos is a powerful rhetorical mode for 
judges and so recognizing the rhetorical requisites of judicial opinion 
writing is not a call to abandon logic without due reflection. 
Still, sometimes the best way to get one’s point across is to show rather 
than tell.  Thus, pathos—appeal to emotion—is a useful rhetorical mode 
even for judges.  In a conventional sense, an appeal to emotion might have 
greater claim to legitimacy in a judicial opinion when it is in the service of 
persuading the reader as to a proposition within the traditional 
interpretive domains of constitutional law.  An emotional appeal as a way 
of advancing a textual or historical claim seems to me entirely within the 
pale, whereas a similar appeal as a way of doing little more than 
persuading someone that a litigant should win or lose, unmediated 
through traditional constitutional subjects of argument, is more 
problematic. 
An example will be helpful. In the 2014 Term, Justice Thomas chose 
to use the Court’s capital docket as a platform for judicially crafted victim 
impact statements.109  Thus, in Glossip v. Gross, he responded to Justice 
Breyer’s dissenting opinion calling for a reconsideration of the 
constitutionality of capital punishment with a catalog of the acts for which 
petitioners who had sought stays of execution during the Term had been 
convicted.110  The ostensible purpose was to demonstrate that capital 
defendants are nearly uniformly deserving of the most severe 
punishment, thereby undermining Justice Breyer’s claim that death 
sentences were handed down arbitrarily.111 
In Brumfield v. Cain, a case involving application of the Court’s 
exemption of mentally disabled persons from execution, Justice Thomas 
wrote a lengthy dissenting opinion that, among other things, detailed the 
remarkable life and public works of the victim’s son, a professional 
football star.112  Justice Thomas appended a photograph of the victim to 
                                                 
109 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2750–55 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring); Brumfield v. 
Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2285 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210 
(2015) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
110 See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2753 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
111 See id. at 2752 (“In my decades on the Court, I have not seen a capital crime that could 
not be considered sufficiently ‘blameworthy’ to merit a death sentence (even when genuine 
constitutional errors justified a vacatur of that sentence).”). 
112 See Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. at 2286–87 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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the end of his opinion.113  Justice Thomas’ discussion of the victim’s son 
was sufficiently unusual that some of his fellow dissenting colleagues 
refused to join it.  Justice Alito wrote (joined by Chief Justice Roberts):  
“The story recounted in that Part is inspiring and will serve a very 
beneficial purpose if widely read, but I do not want to suggest that it is 
essential to the legal analysis in this case.”114  Finally, in Davis v. Ayala, 
which considered the degree of deference owed a state court harmless 
error determination in federal habeas review, Justice Kennedy wrote 
separately to express concern over the proliferation of solitary 
confinement in U.S. prisons.115  Justice Thomas wrote the following curt 
response to Justice Kennedy’s opinion: 
I write separately only to point out, in response to the 
separate opinion of Justice Kennedy that the 
accommodations in which Ayala is housed are a far sight 
more spacious than those in which his victims, Ernesto 
Dominguez Mendez, Marcos Antonio Zamora, and Jose 
Luis Rositas, now rest.  And, given that his victims were 
all 31 years of age or under, Ayala will soon have had as 
much or more time to enjoy those accommodations as his 
victims had time to enjoy this Earth.116 
Needless to say, the opinion in Ayala traveled some distance from 
technical construction of the federal habeas statute. 
Each of the three Justice Thomas opinions referenced above seeks to 
persuade in the pathetic mode—they appeal directly to the emotions of 
the reader.  But they also differ from one another in a respect that lends 
some criteria to our evaluation of constitutional rhetoric.  The Glossip 
opinion appeals to emotion in the service of a claim about the 
consequences of capital punishment.  Justice Breyer’s opinion argues that, 
within our federal system, capital punishment must be either unreliable 
or arbitrary.117  Justice Thomas’ rebuttal consists in arguing that, because 
all capital defendants are deserving of death, capital punishment is not 
arbitrary in a way that should raise moral concern.118 
By contrast, Justice Thomas’ emotional appeals in his Brumfield and 
Ayala opinions do not modify any recognizable constitutional claim.  They 
appear to serve no purpose other than to arouse enmity and, 
                                                 
113 Id. at 2297. 
114 Id. at 2298 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
115 See Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187,  2208–10 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
116 Id. at 2210 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
117 See id. at 2772 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
118 See id. at 2754–55 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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consequently, disgust:  in Brumfield, disgust that someone who committed 
a horrific act may be spared death, and in Ayala, disgust at the prospect 
that the state might be made to attend to a convicted murderer’s 
conditions of confinement.  An emotional appeal directed solely at the 
ultimate disposition in the case feels off-key in a way in which a similar 
appeal that amplifies a recognized legal argument does not.  This is not to 
say that Justice Thomas’ Glossip opinion was not over-the-top or ham-
handed, but it is to say that it fits our constitutional tradition in a way that 
the other two opinions categorically do not.  It is no wonder that 
commentators have compared those opinions to Justice Blackmun’s 
memorable and oft-criticized “Poor Joshua” dissent, which openly 
sympathized with a child abuse victim whom the majority declared not to 
have a constitutional remedy.119 
Even if one measure of the legitimacy of constitutional rhetoric is its 
relationship to traditional forms of constitutional argument, we must ask 
whether it is the only measure.  Beyond that relationship, do we measure 
rhetoric solely by its power to persuade?  Would it be appropriate, for 
example, for a judge to make even a logical case for a proposition of 
constitutional law if she thinks the logical case will persuade others but it 
does not persuade the judge herself or adequately explain her analytic 
process?  This question raises the second unsettling implication of 
understanding rhetoric as having independent normative significance:  
there may be times when rhetorical demands make it appropriate for a 
judicial opinion to take a certain form, or even reach a certain outcome, 
that is at odds with the judge’s own thinking.  Put otherwise, the 
significance of persuasion as a part of the judicial function might well 
compete with the significance of candor or transparency.  In some sense, 
many of us intuit this to be true.  Consider, for example, the role of 
religious conviction in judicial decision making.  We might or might not 
think it is appropriate for religion to influence how a judge approaches a 
constitutional issue.  A committed legal realist or attitudinalist might 
assume the judge in fact has no control over this.  But most of us agree that 
the judge’s personal religious convictions should play no role in the 
opinion the judge writes, and we would find the opinion less persuasive 
as constitutional law if it included religious elements in its written 
                                                 
119 DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 213 (1989) (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting); compare Mark Joseph Stern, Has Clarence Thomas Forgotten What His Job Is?, 
SLATE (June 18, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/ 
jurisprudence/2015/06/clarence_thomas_opinion_in_brumfield_v_cain_has_he_forgotten
_he_s_a_supreme.html [http://perma.cc/2FUG-B9KV], with Jeffrey Rosen, Sentimental 
Journey: The Emotional Jurisprudence of Harry Blackmun, NEW REPUBLIC 13 (May 2, 1994). 
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presentation.  Justice would not, in that case, “be seen to be done.”120  And 
as noted, constitutional law must satisfy this condition. 
At this point one must pause to consider the nature of the judicial 
audience.  I say “we” would find an appeal to religion in constitutional 
argument less convincing, but what I mean by “we” is the professional 
legal elite.  Thus, a third possible and, if true, unsettling implication of the 
argument:  If we believe that persuasion carries independent normative 
weight in constitutional opinion-writing, we must consider the possibility 
that those who ultimately need to be persuaded are not just legally 
unsophisticated but have illiberal ends.  Parochialism and chauvinism 
might be necessary features of a conventionally accepted constitutional 
order.  In fact, the choices are unlikely to be so stark.  I suspect that if the 
American people were in fact illiberal in a higher law sense—that is, were 
not committed in some deep sense to a culture of rights—then we would 
find judicial review intolerable.121  And so when we speak of rhetoric and 
of the demands that the need to persuade places on the judicial role, we 
must understand the object of persuasion to bear not necessarily upon the 
individual outcome in any particular case, but rather upon the consistency 
of the opinion with conventional understandings of the judicial role.  
Political scientists distinguish the “specific support” for decisions of the 
courts from “diffuse support” for courts in an institutional sense.122  
Diffuse support is less sensitive to particular decisions; there is an 
inelasticity to it that suggests a reasonable margin of appreciation for 
courts to reach decisions that members of the polity may disagree with or 
find unpersuasive in their particulars.123 
III.  CONCLUSION 
It is appropriate to close, then, with an observation about the degree 
to which this Essay’s claims are contingent upon a particular judicial 
culture and a particular kind of Constitution.  The case for persuasion 
carrying independent normative weight depends on understanding 
constitutional lawmaking by judges as being in dialogue with the polity.  
Many civil law jurisdictions distinguish sharply between ordinary 
legislative power and what is sometimes called constituent power or 
                                                 
120 R v. Sussex Justices Ex parte McCarthy, [1924] 1 K.B. 256, 259 (1923). 
121 But see Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 
1353 (2006) (arguing that a society with a culture of rights, among other conditions, should 
find judicial review intolerable). 
122 See Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme 
Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635, 637 (1992). 
123 See id. 
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pouvoir constituant.124  Constitutional revision requires activation of that 
constituting power and the role of a constitutional judge is to keep faith 
with constitutional law as codified by those authorized to exercise that 
constituting power.  Jurisdictions in which this view is prominent tend to 
have more accessible modes of constitutional amendment than Article V 
of the U.S. Constitution.125  A constitution that is viewed in different terms 
than the American one, and in particular a constitution that is viewed 
either in large measure as a technical document or one that, even if not 
purely technical, is not associated pervasively with national political 
identity seems likely to place relatively weak demands of persuasion on 
courts.  A constitutional order of that sort seems less likely to give rise to 
a judicial culture that gives rhetoric a long leash.  One’s Frenchness does 
not depend on acceptance of or affiliation with the 1958 Constitution, in 
the way that one’s Americanness might depend on one’s affiliation with 
particular political commitments embodied in the U.S. Constitution.126  
Under the circumstances, the dry syllogistic reasoning one observes in 
French courts, even in constitutional cases, may be good enough.  Notice, 
though, that this might be characterized simply as different weight that 
other jurisdictions might attach to logos as against pathos or ethos in 
assessing what counts as persuasive for judges.  Maintaining consistency 
with the conventional judicial role might well make normative demands 
on opinion writing quite apart from one’s theory of the relationship 
between “the people” and constitutional elaboration.  In that case, the 
application of these observations to U.S. constitutional law simply makes 
a stronger case for attention to rhetoric than would exist under a different 
kind of constitution. 
  
                                                 
124 See Richard S. Kay, Constituent Authority, 59 AM J. COMP. L. 715, 717–19 (2011); 
Emmanuel Joseph Sièyes, What Is the Third Estate?, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 92, 134–37 
(Michael Sonenscher ed., 2003). 
125  See Donald S. Lutz, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment, in RESPONDING TO 
IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 237, 260–62 
(Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (suggesting empirically that the U.S. Constitution is among the 
most difficult in the world to amend). 
126 See Aziz Rana, Constitutionalism and the Foundations of the Security State, 103 CALIF. L. 
REV. 335, 341 (2015). 
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